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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Melvin Savage contends the district court made two different errors in this case. First, he
asserts the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim that his trial attorney was
ineffective for giving him incomplete and inaccurate advice about his ability to invoke his Fifth
Amendment rights. Second, he contends the district court abused its discretion when it refused
to consider his motion for reconsideration, which was based, inter alia, on a claim that postconviction counsel had not been communicating with him or making arguments on his behalf,
for the sole reason that Mr. Savage had filed that motion himself, rather than filing it through the
absent attorney.
For either reason, this Court should remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Savage was charged with arson for setting fire to a
dwelling and with misdemeanor stalking. (See R., pp.7-8.) Around the same time that those
charges were filed, the alleged victims also initiated a civil suit for damages caused by the fire. 1
(See R., pp.17, 60.) Before Mr. Savage was able to have a preliminary hearing in the criminal
case, the alleged victims sought to depose him in the civil case. (See R., p.17 (alleging the
preliminary hearing was scheduled for January 27, 2015); R., p.73 (transcript of the deposition
held on January 26, 2015).) Mr. Savage sought advice from Trent Grant, the attorney appointed

1

One of the alleged victims is a licensed attorney who had been, and continued to, represent
Mr. Savage’s wife in their ongoing divorce proceedings. (R., pp.18-19.)
1

to represent him in the criminal case,2 as to whether there was any way to stop the deposition
because of the risk of self-incrimination. (R., p.16.)
Mr. Grant told Mr. Savage that he could not directly intervene in the civil case, as that
was beyond the scope of his appointment. (R., p.196 (Mr. Grant’s affidavit provided with the
State’s motion for summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition).)

He also advised

Mr. Savage that invoking his rights in the civil proceedings would not do any good, as the
district court would likely order him to answer the questions anyway, and that it would order him
to pay the costs of obtaining and enforcing that order, or even hold him in contempt. (R., pp.16,
201 (Mr. Grant’s affidavit admitting he gave this advice).) Mr. Grant recalled telling Mr. Savage
that any statements he made during the deposition would be admissible in the criminal case, and
that it would have been Mr. Grant’s preference to avoid the deposition if possible. (R., p.201;
but see R., p.248 (Mr. Savage, in his affidavit in support of his motion for reconsideration of
summary dismissal, alleging Mr. Grant had not made either of those statements).)
Based on Mr. Grant’s advice that there was no practical benefit to invoking his Fifth
Amendment rights, and that he would be punished for doing so, Mr. Savage answered questions
during the deposition without invoking his rights.3 (R., pp.16, 19; see generally 73-128.) During
the deposition, Mr. Savage answered several questions which asked him to make incriminating
statements about his actions on the night of the fire. (See generally R., pp.73-128.)
The alleged victim’s attorney provided a copy of the transcript of the deposition to the
prosecutor in the criminal case, who disclosed it to Mr. Grant. (R., p.16.) Mr. Grant advised

2

As part of the civil suit, the alleged victims secured a temporary restraining order (without
notice to Mr. Savage) freezing all his assets, which left him unable to hire counsel of choice.
(R., p.18; see R., p.65-66 (the temporary restraining order, provided as an exhibit to
Mr. Savage’s initial pleadings).)
3
Mr. Savage was not represented by counsel during the deposition. (See R., p.75.)
2

Mr. Savage that his statements in the deposition gave the prosecutor all the ammunition he
needed to convict Mr. Savage, and so, he should not only waive his preliminary hearing, but he
should plead guilty as well. (R., p.17.) Mr. Savage felt “at a loss as to what I could do with no
access to my money to hire a decent lawyer who would look out for my constitutional rights,
rather than sit by as Trent Grant was doing, and letting it occur . . . . As a result I told Trent Grant
to in [sic] March 2015 I would change my plea to guilty.” (R., p.19.)
Mr. Savage ultimately pled guilty to both charges and was sentenced to an aggregate
sentence of nineteen years, with four years fixed.4 (R., p.8.) Mr. Savage appealed from the
judgment of conviction challenging the length of his sentence, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. See State v. Savage, 2016 WL 2595962 (Ct. App. 2016), unpub.
Thereafter, Mr. Savage filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.7-11.)
He argued, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for not taking action in the civil case to
protect his right to be free from self-incrimination in the criminal case. (R., p.21.) The district
court granted his motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel, and Mr. Savage was
ultimately appointed Dan Taylor as conflict counsel. (See R., p.152.) Mr. Taylor filed a motion
to supplement the petition in order to clarify his claim regarding his self-incrimination claim.
(R., p.159; see R., p.209 (order granting that motion).) The only change was to re-word the selfincrimination claim as the failure of Mr. Grant “to effectively advise Petitioner of the application
of the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution.” (R., p.180.) Otherwise, the supplemental petition simply re-incorporated all
Mr. Savage’s prior allegations (which were attached as exhibits); it was not accompanied by any

4

Pursuant to a motion for leniency, the district court ultimately reduced the indeterminate time
by one year. (See R., p.8.)

3

new allegations or arguments. (See generally R., pp.158-80.) The only other thing Mr. Taylor
did while the petition was pending was to stipulate to an extension of time for the prosecutor to
file his motion for summary judgment. (R., p.182; see generally R.)
In regard to the self-incrimination claim, the prosecutor argued that, because Mr. Grant
had talked with Mr. Savage about his Fifth Amendment rights and there was no indication in
Mr. Savage’s filings indicating how trial counsel’s advice in that regard was wrong, Mr. Savage
had not presented a viable claim. (R., p.189.) The prosecutor also argued there was no prejudice
because the State had other evidence besides Mr. Savage’s statements in the deposition which
the prosecutor argued was compelling. (R., p.190.)
Mr. Taylor did not file a response to the motion for summary judgment. (See generally
R.) The district court subsequently granted that motion. (R., pp.213-20.) In regard to the selfincrimination claim, it did so because it found that claim was disproved by the record showing
Mr. Grant had talked with Mr. Savage about his Fifth Amendment rights. (R., p.219.) The
district court did not address the propriety of Mr. Grant’s advice, nor did it address the State’s
prejudice argument. (See generally R., p.219.) Mr. Taylor filed a one-sentence notice of appeal
prior to the final judgment being entered. (R., p.224.)
In the meantime, Mr. Savage filed a pro se motion for reconsideration under I.R.C.P.
59(e), 60(b), and 11.2(b). (R., pp.226-37.) He argued, inter alia, that Mr. Taylor had failed to
effectively communicate with him during the case, and as such, deprived him of a meaningful
opportunity to have his post-conviction claims heard. (R., p.229.) For example, Mr. Savage
asserted he had not seen a copy of the prosecutor’s motion to summarily dismiss his petition until
after the district court had ruled on it. (R., p.231.)

Mr. Savage explained this failure to

communicate was particularly problematic because, had Mr. Taylor discussed the motion for

4

summary dismissal with him, Mr. Savage could have provided an affidavit refuting several of the
specific allegations in Mr. Grant’s affidavit. (R., p.232.) Mr. Savage attached an affidavit in
which he set forth the responses he could have given. (R., pp.242-50.)
In regard to the self-incrimination claim, Mr. Savage would have contradicted
Mr. Grant’s assertion that he had told Mr. Savage that statements he made in the deposition
could be used in the criminal case. (R., p.248.) Rather, Mr. Savage would have alleged,
Mr. Grant’s advice had only been to cooperate with the deposition because of the consequences
that would result from not cooperating. (R., p.248.) He would have also alleged Mr. Grant
“specifically told me I could -not plead the 5th in the civil deposition, and only explained the
severe consequences if I refused to participate in the deposition.” (R., p.247 (emphasis from
original).) Finally, Mr. Savage would have alleged that, had Mr. Grant actually told him the
statements in the deposition could be used in the criminal case, or that Mr. Grant would have
preferred to avoid the deposition, he would not have participated in the deposition. (R., p.248.)
The district court refused to consider Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration for the sole
reason that “this Court will not consider any motions or requests not filed through counsel of
record.” (R., p.265.) The district court entered a final judgment at the same time. (R., p.263.)
Mr. Savage filed a pro se notice of appeal in the form required by I.A.R. 17 timely from the final
judgment and from the order refusing to consider his motion for reconsideration.
(R., pp.290-92.)

5

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Savage’s claim that he
only pled guilty as a result of Mr. Grant’s inaccurate and incomplete advice about his
Fifth Amendment rights.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider Mr. Savage’s
motion for reconsideration because it had not been filed by the attorney who Mr. Savage
was alleging had abandoned the representation.

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Savage’s Claim That He Only Pled
Guilty As A Result Of Mr. Grant’s Inaccurate And Incomplete Advice About His Fifth
Amendment Rights
A.

Standard Of Review
The decision of whether to summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief is a

question of law which is freely reviewed on appeal. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402
(2006).
Post-conviction cases are civil in nature. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008). In
post-conviction cases, a petition may be summarily dismissed only if it does not present a
genuine issue of material fact. Id.; see I.C. § 19-4906(b). In determining whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists, “[a] court is required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations
as true,” though it does not necessarily need to accept the conclusions he draws from those
uncontested facts. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321
(1995). However, the courts are still to “liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party” at the summary judgment phase. 5 Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho
878, 881 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004)
(“[I]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the petitioner.”). When a genuine issue of
material fact exists and would, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor, entitle the petitioner for relief,
the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Berg v. State,
131 Idaho 517, 518 (1998).

5

In this case, the State is the moving party. (R., p.205.) Therefore, the facts and reasonable
inferences are liberally construed in Mr. Savage’s favor. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792;
Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 881.
7

To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell
below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by that deficient performance.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850
(2004). In regard to the second prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner shows prejudice when
he demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different, or, in other words, he must “undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010). In cases where the petitioner alleges
ineffective assistance in a case in which he pled guilty, he must show “‘there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.’” Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 621 (2011) (quoting Ridgley v. State,
148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))).

B.

Mr. Savage’s Allegations Established A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regarding
Whether Mr. Grant Was Ineffective For Giving Him Inaccurate And Incomplete Advice
About His Fifth Amendment Rights
The district court’s determination that there was no genuine issue of material fact because

Mr. Grant had discussed the Fifth Amendment with Mr. Savage is erroneous because an attorney
is not just ineffective when he does not consult with his client, but also when he gives inaccurate
or incomplete advice to his client. See, e.g., Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 620 (2011) (“Given
that the information [counsel] provided when advising Booth to plead guilty to first-degree
murder was based on a blatantly erroneous reading of the sentencing statutes, the district court
did not err in determining that [counsel’s] performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.”). Mr. Grant’s advice to Mr. Savage regarding whether he could protect himself
in the underlying criminal case by invoking the Fifth Amendment in the related civil deposition

8

was similarly deficient because it was directly contrary to United States Supreme Court and
Idaho precedent in several respects.
For example, Mr. Savage alleged that Mr. Grant told him, if he invoked the Fifth
Amendment in the civil deposition, the district court would likely not only require him to answer
the deposition questions anyway, but would also make him pay the costs for seeking and
enforcing that order.

(R., p.16; R., p.201 (trial counsel’s affidavit admitting he gave this

advice).) First, the district court could not have ordered Mr. Savage to answer the questions in
the deposition because the Fifth Amendment “privileges [a person] not to answer official
questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
answers might tend to incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”6 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 77 (1973); accord McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); State v. Van Komen,
160 Idaho 534, 538 (2016). “To hold otherwise would deny the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination the means of its own implementation.” Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 468
(1975). Thus, in cases such as this, “the assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege has been
sustained [i.e., the potential deponent had not been required to answer the questions] when the
court could determine from the questions and their context, or from a showing made by the party
claiming the privilege, that a reasonable possibility of criminal prosecution existed.”
McPherson v. McPherson, 112 Idaho 402, 405 (Ct. App. 1987).
There was obviously a reasonable possibility of criminal prosecution in Mr. Savage’s
case since criminal charges had been filed based on the same acts which the civil deposition

6

One of the allegations Mr. Savage wanted to make in response to the motion for summary
dismissal was that Mr. Grant told him “I could not plead the 5th in the civil deposition.”
(R., p.247 (emphasis from original).) That would have made it clear there was a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether Mr. Grant’s advice had been objectively deficient, and thus, the
denial of his motion for reconsideration was inappropriate. (See Section II(C), infra.)
9

sought to explore. Furthermore, because the questions in the deposition were likely to seek to
establish Mr. Savage committed those acts (so as to establish his tort liability), the answers called
for by the deposition definitely might have tended to incriminate Mr. Savage.

As such,

Mr. Grant’s advice – that there would be no point to claiming the Fifth Amendment because the
district court would just order him to answer – was contrary to the applicable precedent.7 By
giving inaccurate advice about whether Mr. Savage could protect his rights in the criminal case
by invoking the Fifth Amendment in the civil deposition, Mr. Grant’s performance was
objectively unreasonable.
Second, Mr. Grant improperly advised Mr. Savage that the district court could order him
to pay the costs of seeking and enforcing that order, or even might hold him in contempt for
raising that objection: “‘[O]ur cases have established that the State may not impose substantial
penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to not give
incriminating testimony against himself.’” Van Komen, 160 Idaho at 540 (quoting Lefkowitz,
414 U.S. at 805). Requiring the deponent to pay the costs of the deposition simply for raising
Fifth Amendment objection would constitute a substantial penalty for exercising the right and
would impermissibly chill the exercise of that right in future cases; certainly, holding him
in contempt would. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969) (holding that
imposing a penalty for exercising a constitutional right is “patently unconstitutional”). As such,
Mr. Grant’s advice that Mr. Savage should not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights in the civil

7

The fact that Mr. Taylor did not make these arguments in response to the State’s motion for
summary disposition when one of the State’s arguments was there was no explanation as to how
Mr. Grant’s advice was erroneous (see R., p.189), reinforces Mr. Savage’s argument that
Mr. Taylor abandoned him in this case. (See Section II(B), infra.)
10

case because he would be penalized for doing so was also contrary to the controlling precedent,
and thus, was objectively deficient.
More importantly though, even if the district court would have overruled Mr. Savage’s
Fifth Amendment objection, such a ruling would have rendered his answers inadmissible in the
criminal case: “[A] witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and
until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived
therefrom in any subsequent case in which he is a defendant. Absent such protection, if he is
nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are inadmissible against him in a later
prosecution.” Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). Mr. Grant actually attested that he
told Mr. Savage the opposite – that “whatever he said while being deposed could likely be used
against him in the criminal case.” 8 (R., p.201.) As such, Mr. Grant’s advice about how an
invocation of the Fifth Amendment would affect the criminal case was, at least, incomplete, if
not wrong, and thus, was objectively unreasonable.
The prejudicial effect of that objectively-deficient advice is profound.

Because of

Mr. Grant’s erroneous advice that there would be no benefit, and, in fact, would be a penalty, for
invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, Mr. Savage did not invoke his rights at the deposition. As
a result of Mr. Savage’s reliance on that inaccurate advice, Mr. Grant could not file the
otherwise-meritorious motion to suppress those answers in the criminal case.

8

Therefore,

One of the allegations Mr. Savage would have made in response to the motion for summary
dismissal was that Mr. Grant had not actually told him his statements could be used in the
criminal case. (R., p.248 (“[T]he only legal advice he gave me was to cooperate and only
discussed consequences of non-cooperation.”).) Therefore, if the information before the district
court when it summarily dismissed the petition was not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of
material fact, this attempt to contradict Mr. Grant’s affidavit on the material facts (what he told
Mr. Savage about his Fifth Amendment rights and the impact making statements would have on
the criminal case) would demonstrate that Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration was
improperly denied. (See Section II(C)).
11

Mr. Grant’s objectively unreasonable advice left Mr. Savage with no choice but to plead guilty
rather than exercise his right to a trial. (See R., p.19.) Had Mr. Grant given complete and proper
advice about Mr. Savage’s Fifth Amendment rights, Mr. Savage either would not have made
those statements or would have been able to keep them out of the criminal case. Lefkowitz, 414
U.S. at 78. In either case, he would not have pled guilty because those statements would not be
giving the prosecutor all the evidence needed to convict him. (R., pp.17, 19.)
Because Mr. Savage’s allegations established a genuine issue of material fact on both
prongs of Strickland, this Court should reverse the order summarily dismissing his Fifth
Amendment allegation.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Consider Mr. Savage’s Motion For
Reconsideration Because It Had Not Been Filed By The Attorney Who Mr. Savage Was
Alleging Had Abandoned The Representation
A.

Standard Of Review
The decision of whether to grant a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734 (2010). The district court abuses its discretion
when: (1) it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion; (2) it acts beyond the outer bounds
of its discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the applicable legal standards, or (4) it reaches its
decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).
In this case, the district court’s decision was not consistent with the applicable legal standards
and was not reached in an exercise of reason.

12

B.

This Case Should Be Remanded So The District Court Can Reconsider Its Decision In
Light Of The Court Of Appeals’ Recent Decision In Andrus v. State
When the appellate courts clarify the applicable legal standards while a case is pending

on appeal, the appellate courts usually remand the matter so the district court can reconsider its
decision in light of that clarification. State v. Jeske, 2019 WL 1088217, *9 (Mar. 8, 2019) (citing
Davis v. Prof’l Bus. Servs., Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 818 (1985)), not yet final. That rule is
applicable in this case because the Court of Appeals recently clarified the legal standards
regarding a post-conviction petitioner’s claim under Rule 60(b) that post-conviction counsel
abandoned the case. See Andrus v. State, 164 Idaho 565, ___, 433 P.3d 665, 670 (Ct. App.
2019). Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration included a claim for relief under Rule 60(b)
because Mr. Taylor had effectively abandoned him. (R., p.229.) The district court refused to
consider Mr. Savage’s motion for reconsideration because it was not filed through Mr. Taylor.
(R., p.265.)
However, Andrus made it clear that the fact that the petition was filed pro se does not
justify refusing to consider the motion because the fact that the petitioner has to take up the
mantle and do what his post-conviction attorney was appointed to do, but failed to do, actually
“further demonstrates the prejudice associated with a lack of meaningful representation.” Id.
Rather, Andrus explained, the district court has a duty “to establish[] a record of some
meaningful representation on those claims” before denying the Rule 60(b) motion. Andrus, 433
P.3d at 670 (holding “the district court abuses its discretion in dismissing the claims on the
merits without establishing a record of some meaningful representation on those claims”).
The reason the district court has this duty to establish a record of meaningful
representation in such cases is due to the nature of post-conviction cases. Post-conviction is “the
exclusive means for challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence other than by direct

13

appeal.”

Id. at 669. In fact, Idaho’s courts have made it clear that claims of ineffective

assistance should only be brought in post-conviction proceedings because the direct appeal
record will usually be inadequate to sufficiently review such claims. E.g. State v. Hayes, 138
Idaho 761, 766 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting
Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791 (1985) (Bakes, J., specially concurring)). As a result, when
an appointed post-conviction attorney effectively abandons that representation, potentially-valid
constitutional claims could be dismissed without being properly assessed by the courts. Andrus,
433 P.3d at 670.
This is particularly problematic in the post-conviction context because petitioners have
no outside recourse to remedy such situations. They cannot, for example, raise those issues in a
successive petition for post-conviction relief. Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395 (2014)
(explaining ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not justify a successive
petition because there is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in post-conviction cases,
and so, there is no corresponding right to effective post-conviction counsel).
Therefore, Idaho provides a mechanism within the post-conviction proceedings to allow
petitioners to address such circumstances:

“Given the unique status of a post-conviction

proceeding, and given the complete absence of any meaningful representation in the only
available proceeding for [the petitioner] to advance constitutional challenges to his conviction
and sentence, we conclude this case may present the unique and compelling circumstances in
which I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief may well be warranted.” Eby, 148 Idaho at 737; see Parvin v.
State, 157 Idaho 518, 521 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding Eby can read harmoniously with Murphy);
accord Andrus, 433 P.3d at 668-70.
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As such, the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Savage’s Rule 60(b) motion without
establishing a record of some meaningful representation by post-conviction counsel is
inconsistent with the applicable legal standards. Andrus, 433 P.3d at 670. However, since the
district court did not have the benefit of Andrus when it made that decision (see R., p.265), this
Court should remand this case so the district court can reconsider its decision in light of the
proper legal standards.

C.

The District Court’s Decision To Deny Mr. Savage’s Motion For Reconsideration Was
Not Reached Through An Exercise Of Reason, Nor Was It Consistent With The Existing
Legal Standards
Even if this Court does not remand this case for reconsideration in light of Andrus, it

should still conclude that the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Savage’s Rule
60(b) motion. As noted in Section II(B), supra, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly considered
the merits of this sort of claim even though the motion was filed pro se rather than through
appointed counsel. See, e.g., Devan v. State, 162 Idaho 520, 522-23 (Ct. App. 2017), rev.
denied; Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 705-06 (Ct. App. 2015); Eby, 148 Idaho at 733. Therefore,
the district court’s basis for denying that motion was not consistent with the applicable legal
standards. Moreover, that basis did not constitute an exercise of reason since there is no realistic
scenario where the absent attorney, who was already failing to file documents or make
arguments on the petitioner’s behalf, would actually file such a motion. In fact, it would likely
be improper for that attorney to file such a motion, as it would constitute a conflict of interest.
Additionally, Mr. Savage’s motion shows that the unique and compelling circumstances
required under Rule 60(b)(6) were actually present in his case. He asserted Mr. Taylor was not
communicating with him while the case was pending, evidenced by the fact that Mr. Taylor did
not file a response to the motion for summary judgment. (R., p.229.) That was particularly
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problematic because Mr. Savage asserted he could have refuted several specific allegations in
Mr. Grant’s affidavit, upon which that motion was based. Compare Bias, 157 Idaho at 707
(explaining relief was not merited under Rule 60(b) when the record showed post-conviction
counsel had filed a brief in response to the motion for summary dismissal and supported that
response with additional affidavits).
For example, had Mr. Taylor communicated with Mr. Savage, he would have alleged that
Mr. Grant did not tell him that the statements he made in the deposition could be used in the
criminal case. (R., p.248; compare R., p.201 (trial counsel’s affidavit alleging he gave that
advice to Mr. Savage).) Mr. Savage also would have alleged that trial counsel had not told him
about the potential that any self-incriminating statements he made in the civil deposition could be
used outside the civil case, or that trial counsel’s “preference would be to avoid the Deposition.”
(R., p.248; compare R., p.201 (trial counsel’s affidavit asserting he advised Mr. Savage on both
points).) Both of those allegations would have created genuine issues of fact on the material
issue of what, exactly, Mr. Grant’s advice was. See Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence,
153 Idaho 411, 418-19 (2012) (explaining that, where there are conflicting allegations of fact in
the record, there is a genuine issue of material fact). As such, those responses would have
prevented summary dismissal because “it is not proper for the trial judge to assess the credibility
of an affiant at the summary judgment stage when credibility can be tested in court before the
trier of fact” at an evidentiary hearing. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable
Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 127 (2009).
Additionally, as noted in Section I(B), supra, Mr. Savage would have made additional
allegations on the prejudice prong, as he would have asserted, if Mr. Grant had told him that the
deposed statements would be admissible in the criminal case and Mr. Grant would have
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preferred to avoid the deposition if possible, he would have refused to answer the questions in
the deposition. (R., p.248.)
The fact that Mr. Taylor did not file a response to the motion for summary dismissal,
especially one which would have prevented the summary dismissal, due to the fact that he was
not communicating with Mr. Savage, shows the complete abandonment that justifies relief under
Rule 60(b). Compare Eby, 148 Idaho at 733 (explaining relief was proper under Rule 60(b)
when all post-conviction counsel did was ask for continuances and review the petitioner’s pro se
filings), with Devan, 162 Idaho at 523 (explaining relief was not merited when the record
showed ongoing communication between the petitioner and post-conviction counsel, in which
they discussed whether specific additional evidence could be presented to support the claims).
Therefore, even if this Court considers the merits of the order denying Mr. Savage’s Rule 60(b)
motion, it should reverse that order because it constitutes an abuse of the district court’s
discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Savage respectfully requests this Court reverse the order summarily dismissing his
petition and remand this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he respectfully requests this
Court vacate or reverse the order denying his motion for reconsideration and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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